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As his new term begins, President Bush has been trying to focus his
domestic agenda on what he calls the “ownership society,” a sweeping
vision of an America in which more citizens would hold significant assets
and be free to make their own choices about providing for their health care
and retirement, and educating their children. L. Randall Wray, who has
written for the Levy Institute on many topics, evaluates the premises and
logic of this program in this new public policy brief.
Wray points out that much of the history of the Western world since
the advent of liberalism has been marked by a gradual rise in the power of
those who lack property. Some of the milestones in this progression
include universal suffrage, regulation of business, and progressive taxa-
tion. Bush’s ownership society proposals, according to Wray, would result
in a partial reversal of the progress of the last 250 years.
The reason is that,while Bush’s plans would undoubtedly increase the
choices and power of those who have property, they would fail to democ-
ratize ownership. Many gains to the wealthy would come at the expense of
the poor, the sick, and the elderly.
Consider, for example, the condition of the nation’s private pension
system. Increasingly, firms are switching from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans. This development would seem on its surface to favor
the establishment of a new class of stockholders, empowered and holding
a larger stake in the system.But,as Wray demonstrates,retirement accounts
and other assets just do not add up to a substantial amount for most
Americans. This means that most citizens have much to lose indeed from
attacks on Social Security and the erosion of the traditional pension system.
Much as the safety net for the poor has largely vanished since the
Reagan years, the bread-and-butter benefits and rights of the middle class
are now threatened by the ownership-society agenda. To many, the claim
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made by Republicans that all should take responsibility for their well-
being rings true. But it is important to keep in mind the real alternative to
public benefits for the middle class: a society in which success would
depend largely upon luck, inheritances, or charity. A society that forces
individuals to read their future in their Microsoft Money files inevitably
creates a class of nonowners who are insecure and lack independent
means. Ironically, this runs up against the aims of those who sincerely
hope for a world in which more have the opportunity to become rich:
moving upward often brings some setbacks along the way,which might be
fatal in a world of reduced bankruptcy protection, disability and medical
benefits, and educational aid.
But Wray makes the case best himself. As always, I welcome your
comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
July 2005The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
The Social Security debate has grabbed most of the headlines, but
President Bush’s attempt to reform that program represents only the open-
ing salvo of the neoconservatives’plan to create what has been labeled “the
ownership society.”
1 Other “reforms” contemplated or already under way
include tightening bankruptcy law,replacing income and wealth taxes with
consumption taxes, transferring health care burdens to patients, devolu-
tion of government responsibility (while relieving state and local govern-
ments of the burden of “unfunded mandates”), substituting “personal
reemployment and training accounts” for unemployment benefits, “No
Child Left Behind” and school vouchers legislation, eliminating welfare
“entitlements,”bridling “runaway trial lawyers,”transforming private pen-
sions to defined-contribution plans, the movement against government
“takings,”and continuing attempts to hand national resources over to pri-
vate exploiters. Hence, while Peter H. Wehner (Bush’s director of strategic
initiatives) recognizes that privatization of Social Security would “rank as
one of the most significant conservative undertakings of modern times,”
the neocons have a full plate of other “ownership society”policy proposals
(Wall Street Journal 2005).
What is an ownership society, and what do these proposals have in
common? At first blush,it may not be obvious that attacks on trial lawyers,
promotion of consumption taxes,and privatization of Social Security have
much in common.But as we shall see,the theme common to all these pro-
posals is the desire to create an ownership society. During the 2004 cam-
paign,President Bush proclaimed:“The more ownership there is in America,
the more vitality there is in America,and the more people have a vital stake
in the future of this country” (White House 2004). The centerpiece of his
“Agenda”was the belief that “every American should have the right to own
his or her home, to build his or her own future, and to have the flexibility
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to make the decisions about their own health care and retirement.”
In addition, his “ownership” manifest included the promise to “fix Social
Security,”expand saving and investment through tax-free savings accounts,
reform pension rules and streamline retirement accounts, endorse health
savings accounts,repeal “death taxes,”promote “affordable,reliable”energy,
and “reduce the lawsuit burden.”Taken together, the policy changes would
encourage ownership and individual responsibility.While supporters hold
out the promise that access to wealth will be broadened by the president’s
agenda,this brief will argue that such policies actually are likely to increase
inequality, a point that undermines an important justification for pro-
posed ownership-society programs.
Ownership, Responsibility, and the Role of Government
The supporters of the president’s reform agenda claim that ownership
promotes responsibility, good citizenship, active participation in soci-
ety, and care of the environment. As the Cato Institute’s David Boaz
explains, “People who are owners feel more dignity, more pride, and
more confidence.They have a stronger stake,not just in their own prop-
erty, but in their community and their society” (Boaz 2005). Owners
have a permanent stake in America that “renters” and transient “users”
of resources do not.
2 Public ownership of resources, or public provision
of services, encourages abuse—as in Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the
commons” (Hardin 1968)—and, worse, removes the incentive for indi-
viduals to behave in their own long-term interest. The uncertainty asso-
ciated with relying on publicly owned and provided services arises from
the fact that politicians can (and do) change the rules regarding access
to them. This reinforces the short view and a lack of responsibility.
Hence, only private ownership can empower individuals and provide
the discipline and real freedom to induce Americans to take control of
their health care, education, and retirement. “Talking with staff, Bush
emphasizes that he wants to use these policies to move from an ‘anything-
goes culture’ to a ‘responsibility culture.’ By giving individuals control of
their own retraining, their own savings, and their own homes, he hopes to
inculcate self-reliance, industriousness, and responsibility”(Brooks 2003).
Americans can then respond efficiently to market signals and self-interest.
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In an important sense, the policy transformation envisioned would
remove most of the remaining vestiges of New Deal programs that were
designed to protect Americans with little wealth from the market. Social
Security is,of course,the most visible of President Roosevelt’s legacies and
therefore an obvious target of those advancing “the biggest political idea
since the New Deal,” as James Glassman puts it.
3 However, the ultimate
goal of the most fervent “ownership” proponents is to loosen all public
safety nets as well as all public management of resources.In their view,the
primary role of government is to encourage ownership, and through this,
individual responsibility, which is supposed to promote the interests of
individuals as well as those of society as a whole.As we will see,proponents
claim that “owners” are already in the majority, and that misguided gov-
ernment policy is a major barrier to ownership by society’s downtrodden.
Hence, the elimination of New Deal and other obstacles is supposed to
democratize access to wealth. Implicitly, government is to operate in the
interests of the owning class—a class that should expand as these reforms
are implemented—which means that it may have to side with owners
against the nonowning,“transient”classes.
This perspective has a long pedigree. The father of economics, Adam
Smith,proclaimed:“Civil government,so far as it is instituted for the secu-
rity of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against
the poor,or of those who have some property against those who have none
at all” (Smith 1937, p. 674). John Locke expressed the same sentiment:
“Government has no other end but the preservation of property”; and
Locke’s editor quotes James Tyrell to the effect that the “main end of [gov-
ernment] is to maintain the Dominion or Property before agreed on”
(Locke 1988, p. 329). Even clearer was Gouverneur Morris:“Property was
the main object of Society. The savage state was more favorable to liberty
than the Civilized; and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by all men
who had not acquired a taste for property; it was only renounced for the
sake of property which could only be secured by the restraints of regular
Government”(quoted in Nedelsky 1990, p. 68). This stance was advocated
by other propertied framers of the Constitution,including the more mod-
erate James Madison, who argued, “The first object of government is the
protection of the different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.”
4
While Madison also recognized the importance of protecting the rights of
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people, he put the rights of property first, because he feared that in
America the majority might tyrannize the wealthy few—that is, the best
government would be one “ruled by propertied elites and insulated from
direct popular control.”
5
In this view, property is not only the origin of society and the reason
for government, but also a hallmark of civilization.
6 The push for an own-
ership society by President Bush and the neocons must be placed within
this broad historical and ideological framework.Government policy ought
to promote the interests of owners, who will act as responsible stewards of
privatized resources, while protecting the owning classes against the
nonowning classes, who tend to make excessive demands for entitlements
and legal protection. The ownership-society movement represents a con-
servative reaction to what many see as the erosion of the rights of the
propertied over the past two centuries.
The Agenda
To be sure, many of the elements of this agenda have been around a long
time. In this section we will consider some of the major components of
the strategy.
Social Security’s opponents have waged battle continuously since
1935—although they did not achieve much success before 1983’s huge tax
hikes and the transformation of the program to “advance funding.” I will
not repeat my detailed analysis of the politics behind the current effort to
“reform” Social Security (Wray 2005). However, it is worthwhile to quote
from an internal memo authored by Peter Wehner in January 2005 that
laid out the president’s strategy on Social Security:
Subject: Some Thoughts on Social Security
I wanted to provide to you our latest thinking (not for attribution) on Social
Security reform. I don’t need to tell you that this will be one of the most
important conservative undertakings of modern times. If we succeed in
reforming Social Security, it will rank as one of the most significant conserva-
tive governing achievements ever. . . . Our strategy will probably include
speeches early this month to establish an important premise: the current sys-
tem is heading for an iceberg. The notion that younger workers will receive
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anything like the benefits they have been promised is fiction,unless significant
reforms are undertaken. We need to establish in the public mind a key fiscal
fact: right now we are on an unsustainable course. That reality needs to be
seared into the public consciousness. . . . (Wall Street Journal 2005)
After admitting that the favored plan to partially privatize Social
Security through personal accounts would do nothing to resolve forecast
financial shortfalls, the president has proposed eliminating wage indexing
of benefits for all but the poorest Americans. As economist and New York
Times columnist Paul Krugman has argued, the combination of private
accounts plus elimination of wage indexing means that Social Security
benefit payments to middle- and upper-income retirees would become a
relatively insignificant source of retirement income in the future
(Krugman 2005b). Over time, Social Security would be transformed from
a program that provides important benefits for most Americans to one
targeted to low-income retirees. As Krugman put it, this could “turn
F.D.R.’s most durable achievement into an unpopular welfare program, so
some future president will be able to attack it with tall tales about Social
Security queens driving Cadillacs”(an obvious reference to a favorite anec-
dote associated with President Reagan), and “once a program is defined as
welfare, it becomes a target for budget cuts.”Recent polls confirm that the
majority of Americans are not willing to impose benefit cuts on middle- and
high-income households in order to protect the benefits of the poorest
Americans.
7
But Social Security privatization is just one ingredient of the envi-
sioned evolution to an ownership society; and many of the other compo-
nents have a long pedigree—the only thing that is new is the audacious
scope of the agenda.Devolution of government responsibilities to the state
and local levels began in the early 1970s,as did the metamorphosis of state
and local tax payments from a “social responsibility” to a sort of “fee for
service” transaction between taxpaying “stakeholders” and governmental
“service providers” (Plotkin and Scheuerman 1994). Because the federal
government chronically underfunded the devolved responsibilities, state
and local governments focused their energies on satisfying the service
requirements of their most influential constituency: the property-owning
suburban middle class.At first, the federal government mostly overlooked
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the failure to fund mandated programs for the disadvantaged. It now
comes full circle, as it considers requests to exempt state and local govern-
ments from the “unfunded mandates.”
Similarly, the “antitakings” movement in the West has long hindered
the federal government from operating in the public interest, while the
management of our nation’s natural resources habitually pits private exploit-
ative interests against public interests. In recent days, policy has shifted
sharply to favor logging, energy, and mining interests, as President Bush
overturned a Clinton-era rule protecting 60 million acres of federal forests
from development. Now state governors must submit petitions to the U.S.
Forest Service if they want to maintain the restrictions; otherwise, envi-
ronmentally sensitive forests will be open to road construction.According
to Representative Nancy Pelosi of California,“Early in his presidency, the
Bush Administration announced their support for President Clinton’s
roadless rule.Since then,they failed to defend the rule from lawsuits of the
timber industry,and in fact worked hand in hand with opponents to over-
turn the rule in court”(Doering 2005). In the days ahead, emboldened by
Bush’s perceived mandate, the administration is likely to open more
wilderness to “ownership.”
In the education arena, the voucher system has long been used as a car-
rot to encourage school privatization, while the “No Child Left Behind”
policy—the latest version of the “stick” used to push children into private
schools—threatens to reduce funding for the neediest, “failing” public
schools. As proponents David Salisbury and Neal McCluskey define it: “By
making primary and secondary education part of the ownership society,con-
gressional Republicans would show that they trust parents to make the most
important decisions about their own children. Moreover, giving people a say
over where and from whom their children learn would do for K–12 educa-
tion what personal Social Security accounts and health savings accounts
would do for retirement and health care” (Salisbury and McCluskey 2005).
8
Subjecting education to market incentives and increasing parental responsi-
bility will play key roles in creating the envisioned ownership society.
As mentioned, the neocon agenda includes a plan to “reform” pen-
sions. Employers have already converted most pensions to defined-contri-
bution plans, and the government has allowed corporations to raid the
funds whenever equity markets perform well—while it is lax about forcing
 The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
them to make up the difference when portfolios do badly.
9 United 
Airlines recently defaulted on its pension commitments, having failed to
adequately fund them over the past several years—even though its unions
had advised management three or four years previously that the pensions
were heading for insolvency (Corley 2005). Further, this comes after
unions had already made concessions to keep United afloat. According 
to Zvi Bodie, former consultant to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), United’s default adds $10 billion in liabilities to 
the PBGC, which is already insolvent (based on future commitments) by
some $23 billion (Bodie 2005). United’s employees are particularly
incensed because the PBGC will guarantee only $7 billion of the promised
pensions, since it imposes a cap of $45,000 per year on individual bene-
fits, meaning some retirees will lose between 30 and 50 percent of their
pensions. Current employees will be switched to defined-contribution
plans, subjecting their pensions to ownership-society market forces.
Congress is considering legislation “that would allow major airlines to
stretch out $20 billion in unpaid pension liabilities over 25 years,” even as
Delta Air Lines disclosed that it might also seek bankruptcy protection
(Maynard 2005)—which might include defaulting on its own defined- 
benefit plan. In the interview cited above, Bodie hinted that an unnamed
automaker (most likely General Motors) could be next, which would
almost certainly mean the end of the PBGC and the safety net it provides
for private pensions. Could this be another important milestone in the
promotion of individual responsibility as envisioned by the proponents of
the ownership society?
Workers who gave up wage increases for improved pension plans will
be doubly subjected to “market forces,”retiring with low lifetime earnings
(hence, little personal savings) and underfunded employer-provided pen-
sions. If “reformers” succeed, they can make that a triple threat by also
removing the Social Security leg of the retirement stool. This is sold as a
risk-reducing reform that will wrest control from incompetent or irre-
sponsible politicians of the future, who might not pay promised Social
Security benefits when they come due (Wray 2005). As a result, the sup-
posed certainty of high market returns that compound interest guarantees,
along with extreme reliance on Wall Street fortunes,will undergird the sin-
gle leg of the ownership-society retirement stool.
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The judicial decision that allows United Airlines to default on its obli-
gations came soon after Congress tightened access to bankruptcy under
Chapter 7. Constraining trial lawyers also ranks high on the neocon
agenda,as this will force patients and consumers to take more responsibil-
ity for their own botched medical procedures, prescriptions for faulty
drugs, and injuries suffered through the use of products with cost-mini-
mizing design flaws. As Glassman (2005) explains, Americans are coming
to “see their interests as aligned with businesses they have poured their sav-
ings into”; hence, trial lawyers are doing them a disservice with malprac-
tice suits that reduce stock values and wealth. Restricting access to the
courts would not only put owners in control but would also increase their
accumulation of equity value! This is seen as a clear win-win in the battle
to create a nation of owners while undermining legal protection and the
“entitlements” that have impeded unbridled wealth accumulation and
concentration.According to a report in the New York Times, supporters of
the new legislation were “giddy” at the prospect of removing bankruptcy
protection that dates back to 1898—indeed,the National Retail Federation
issued its congratulatory statement to Congress before the act passed,
assured that lobbying by creditors would guarantee victory for the ironi-
cally titled Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (Labaton 2005).
Given that about half of all personal bankruptcies are due to medical
costs, reducing bankruptcy protection can be seen as something of a pre-
condition to “reform”of health care that would lay more “personal respon-
sibility”on the American consumer,since the privatized health care system
would otherwise be faced with exploding costs as uninsured patients
sought relief from the courts (Labaton 2005). Indeed, the United States
was already well on its way to reducing the tripartite health care “entitle-
ments” represented by employer-provided health care, Medicare for the
aged,and Medicaid for the poor.
10 Rapidly rising private health care insur-
ance has caused employers to evade or shift costs. (It is estimated that
General Motors pays $1,500 per vehicle for health care costs; see Krugman
2005c.) By 2004,only 6 percent of employers paid the premiums for health
care coverage of their workers and families, down from 11 percent in 2000
(Freudenheim 2005). The average share of the annual premium paid 
by employees in large- and medium-size firms reached $2,800 in 2004,
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up from $2,200 in 2003. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation esti-
mates that 20 million workers have no insurance at all (Krugman 2005a).
The 2004 Economic Report of the President explains that “many of them
may remain uninsured as a matter of choice,” as “they are young and
healthy and do not see the need for insurance.” Hence, as the employer-
paid portion of health care coverage declines and as the burden shifts to
workers, more of them are “free to choose” to go without coverage—an
essential component of the plan to create a society that promotes individ-
ual responsibility.
Medicaid is also under siege across the nation,as tight state budgets force
cutbacks. Medicaid has become the single largest item in most state budgets,
and nearly all states are trying to restrain its growth. Perhaps the best exam-
ple is Missouri, which plans to cut 90,000 people from the Medicaid rolls
(Morris 2005).Even low-wage workers with young children will be dropped,
since the new maximum income limit is just $86 per week for a mother with
three children. Missouri governor Matt Blunt argued that he had no choice,
that the only alternative would have been to raise taxes, and he “[doesn’t]
know what is moral about raising taxes.”Further,Frank Morris reported that
the “governor believes that under some circumstances cutting some people
off Medicaid will actually do them good.” Blunt’s press secretary, Jessica
Robinson, elaborated: “Concern or fear over losing health coverage could
become motivation enough to learn a new trade or to seek out a position that
will otherwise provide coverage.” Hence, erosion of Medicaid in Missouri is
designed to increase personal responsibility for health care while providing
incentives to enhance one’s marketability in labor markets.
The Bush administration has also announced plans to create a com-
mission “to make longer-term recommendations on the future of the
Medicaid program” (Pear 2005c). Although Congress had wanted “an
independent commission under the auspices of the National Academy of
Sciences,” Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael O. Leavitt
rejected that, announcing that he would appoint all voting members. He
has repeatedly claimed that Medicaid is “unsustainable,”in language strik-
ingly similar to that used by the cochairs of the Bush commission that pro-
posed privatizing Social Security. Given Leavitt’s prior beliefs, it is
probable that the composition of the advisory panel will reflect a bias
toward major “reform”of Medicaid.
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Turning to the other primary federal health care program, Medicare
insurance premiums should rise by 12 percent next year, having already
risen by 17.4 percent in 2005 and by 13.5 percent in 2004 (Bloomberg.com
2005). Medicare patients’ out-of-pocket liability for hospitalization will
reach nearly $1,000 by 2006.Note that the script laid out for Medicare and
Medicaid by reformers is similar to that previously composed for Social
Security. Huge increases in premiums and out-of-pocket expenses will
reduce satisfaction with the program (just as Fed chairman Alan
Greenspan’s payroll tax hikes in 1983 helped to create the view that Social
Security is a “bad deal” in terms of “money’s worth” calculations for
younger workers), while hysteria about “unfunded liabilities” will “estab-
lish in the public mind” the belief that Medicare is also “on an unsustain-
able course,” as Wehner advised in his memo detailing the president’s
strategy on Social Security. Frequent public statements by Greenspan help
to drive home the belief that drastic cuts to “entitlements” will be neces-
sary sooner rather than later, as we transform the health care delivery sys-
tem in a manner that will advance the goals of the ownership society.
President Bush’s prescription drug benefits included in the Orwellian-
titled Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 forced seniors to choose
among complex and uncertain private plans—a sort of preview of the
coming privatization of Social Security and the inevitable difficulty of
choosing among alternative private accounts. Advocates for low-income
Medicare recipients claim the forms are so complex that as few as 5 per-
cent of those eligible will apply for the new prescription drug benefit (Pear
2005a). Further, low-income or disabled seniors who opt for the Medicare
prescription drug benefits will lose some of their food stamps due to the
“Modernization Act” (Pear 2005b). To increase enrollment in Bush’s drug
program, the poorest, oldest, and sickest of Medicare’s beneficiaries (the
so-called “dual eligibles,” who also qualify for Medicaid) will be dropped
by the relatively simple and generous Medicaid drug benefits plan on
January 1, 2006, at which time they must choose one of Medicare’s priva-
tized plans. Those in charge of the new drug plan urged bed-bound sen-
iors in nursing homes to go to the Internet to undertake a comprehensive
comparative analysis of the myriad private plans available. Ironically, the
drug benefits program is so complex that the draft 2006 Medicare hand-
book has to be revised, because it contains so many statements that are
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“inaccurate, misleading, or unclear, even to people who have worked on
the program for decades”(Pear 2005d).
Some of the misleading statements appear to be intentional. For
example, the handbook falsely and “repeatedly suggests that private plans
offer a better value than the traditional Medicare program,”and it wrongly
paints Medicare as a “fee-for-service”plan like smaller,private plans  (Pear
2005d). In fact, Medicare covers 36 million people with uniform premi-
ums and copayments set by law, while the tiny private plans cover fewer
than 100,000 patients nationwide and are free to set their own rates.
Premiums for the prescription plan will rise by 60 percent next year—a
sort of presidential mocking of AARP and others who joined the band-
wagon supporting the Bush plan. And because Medicare is forbidden to
negotiate prices, those premiums are likely to rise quickly, as the pharma-
ceutical companies raise profit margins. In addition, those seniors who
delay signing up for the program will be faced with a penalty: a 1-percent-
per-month surcharge will be added to premiums for those who fail to sign
up by May 2006. Rising costs, penalties, program complexity, and cuts 
to other benefits (such as food stamps) will help to build dissatisfaction
with “entitlement” programs, and to nudge recipients to “responsibility-
enhancing”private plans.
Further, the drug benefits plan added an “unfunded liability of $18.2
trillion projected out infinitely,” helping to deplete Medicare’s trust fund
by 2020 (Weisman 2005).Medicare’s total “unfunded liability”is estimated
at $65.4 trillion, or six times Social Security’s supposed shortfall.
Reformers will be using numbers such as these to create a “reality” that
“needs to be seared into the public consciousness,” as Wehner put it, to
generate public acquiescence to the elimination of health care “entitle-
ments,” while “personal responsibility” is promoted and ultimately
restored through privatization. Martin Feldstein has argued that “Social
Security privatization and health savings accounts—tax shelters designed
to encourage people to pay medical costs out of their own pockets—are
only the beginning.‘Investment-based personal accounts,’ he says, are the
way to go for unemployment insurance and Medicare, too” (Krugman
2005a). In other words, all of the benefits programs that came out of New
Deal thinking are now on the table, as candidates for changes promoting
personal responsibility and “ownership.”
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Over the years, the nation has already made significant progress in
transforming the tax system to favor ownership. Income tax rate cuts,
especially for high earners,as well as the reduction or elimination of inher-
itance, corporate, and capital gains taxes, have shifted relative tax burdens
away from the rich. When we also take into account the large payroll tax
hikes enacted in the 1983 “reform” of Social Security, and the continuing
devolution that pushes the tax burden toward regressive state and local
taxes, this shift is all the more apparent. Some reformers would like to
complete the transformation by moving to a consumption tax—putting
even more of the tax burden on working families that consume their
incomes, while the saving and owning classes could enjoy lower taxes on
their accumulation of wealth. Freeing inheritances from the “death tax”
and privatizing Social Security to make benefits inheritable are, of course,
consistent with this endeavor.
11
In sum, there is a wide variety of policy initiatives that can wear the
guise of promoting creation of the ownership society. There can be little
doubt that these reforms will advance the interests of owners; the question
is whether they are likely to broaden ownership, or whether they are more
likely to widen the gap between the well-heeled and the working classes.
An Ownership Reality Check
Supporters of these reforms claim their proposals are targeted to “modest-
income citizens in particular,” affording them “the chance to build inher-
itable wealth,” a chance that would “open the door to a whole new life”
(Glassman 2005). They argue that ownership is already widespread, and
that their agenda will allow for an even broader distribution of wealth.“It
already is an ‘ownership society,’ and the voters seem to like it that way.
Managing securities is no longer something just for the toffs; some 27 per-
cent of American households own stocks or mutual funds, according to
census data. Nearly 30 percent have a 401(k) plan and 23 percent have an
IRA or Keogh plan.About 65 percent own interest-bearing assets at finan-
cial institutions. Nearly 70 percent own their primary residence. Median
net worth was $86,100 in 2001 and average net worth $395,500”(Melloan
2005). Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
(Federal Reserve 2001; the source for all the data on wealth and debt that
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follow) demonstrates that more than half of all households do own corpo-
rate equities,either directly or indirectly,with stocks,bonds,mutual funds,
and retirement accounts amounting to two-thirds of family financial
assets (which in turn accounted for 42 percent of total family assets in
2001). Nearly 93 percent of all families held some type of financial asset,
and about 60 percent of all families in which the head was between ages 35
and 64 held a retirement account. However, these numbers hide a signifi-
cantly unequal distribution of ownership and indebtedness, and that
inequality is likely to be made worse by proposed “reforms.”
Table 1 shows 2001 wealth by family characteristic and asset type.
The median net worth for families with income in the bottom quintile
amounted to just $7,900. For minorities, it was only $17,100, versus
almost $121,000 for families with a white, non-Hispanic head. Rates of
ownership of a primary residence were only 14 percent and 46.8 percent,
respectively, for families in the bottom net-worth quartile and for minor-
ity families. As Table 1 shows, families in the bottom wealth quartile had
a median net worth equal to just $1,100, while the median net worth for
families in the next quartile amounted to $41,000. By contrast, the fortu-
nate few in the top decile of income earners enjoyed a median family net
worth of $834,000; for those in the top decile of wealth holders, it was
$1.3 million. The mean family net worth for the top income decile was
nearly $2.3 million, and for the top wealth decile it was over $2.75 
million—indicating a substantial concentration of wealth at the very top.
While under 4 percent of families in the lowest income quintile held
stocks or mutual funds,61 percent of families in the top decile held stocks,
and 49 percent held mutual funds. Seventy-five percent of families in the
lowest income quintile held some type of financial asset, but as shown in
Table 1,the median value of holdings amounted to just $2,000.Nearly 100
percent of families in the top two deciles held financial assets,with median
family holdings for those in the top decile reaching $364,000. By contrast,
median family holdings of financial assets among people of color was just
over $7,000, and for families that did not own a home, median financial
wealth was less than $4,000. Families with a head aged 55 to 64 (that is,
with a head on the verge of retirement) held median net worth at a sub-
stantial $182,000. However, their median holding of financial assets
12
totaled less than $57,000—clearly insufficient to provide a decent standard
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All families 86.1 395.5 20.0 35.0
Income percentile
Less than 20 7.9 52.6 7.5 21.0
20–39.9 37.2 114.3 10.0 24.0
40–59.9 62.5 160.9 7.0 24.0
60–79.9 141.5 292.1 17.0 30.0
80–89.9 263.1 456.5 20.0 28.0
90–100 833.6 2,258.2 50.0 87.5
Age of head (yrs.)
Less than 35 11.6 90.7 5.7 9.0
35–44 77.6 259.5 15.0 17.5
45–54 132.0 485.6 15.0 38.5
55–64 181.5 727.0 37.5 60.0
65–74 176.3 673.8 85.0 70.0
75 or more 151.4 465.9 60.0 70.0
Race or ethnicity of head
White non-Hispanic 120.9 482.9 22.0 40.0
People of color** 17.1 115.3 8.0 17.5
Housing status
Owner 171.7 558.1 22.0 40.0
Renter or other 4.8 55.0 6.3 10.0
Net worth percentile
Less than 25 1.1 0.0 1.3 2.0
25–49.9 40.8 44.1 3.2 5.0
50–74.9 156.1 165.7 8.3 15.0
75–89.9 430.2 449.4 25.6 37.5
90–100 1,301.9 2,754.9 122.0 140.0
Family 
characteristic














*Note: Value of family holdings by type of asset is for those families that hold the type of asset (families
without the asset are excluded from calculation of median value). This biases asset values upward, particu-
larly for low-income and low-wealth families, because asset ownership is uncommon for these families. For
example, only 3.7 percent of all families in the lowest quintile of earnings hold stocks, while nearly 54 
percent of families in the top decile own stocks. Similarly, only 38.8 percent of families in the lowest quin-
tile own a primary residence, while 93.1 percent of those in the top decile do. Hence, a large majority of the
nonowning families in the lowest quintile (whose asset value would be zero) are excluded in calculating
median family holdings, while very few families in the top decile do not own primary residences—hence,
median values for the top decile would not be affected much if those without such assets were included.
 On the other hand, median debt values are biased upward for those in the bottom income and
wealth percentiles.However,the bias is smaller for debt because the differences across percentiles
are smaller. For example, only 25.5 percent of families in the lowest quintile have installment
debt, versus 41.2 percent of families in the top decile. About 49 percent of families in the lowest
quintile have some kind of debt, versus 85 percent of those in the top decile. Hence, the bias is
not important for debt values.
**This category is called “nonwhite or Hispanic”in the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Source: www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html
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29.0 28.0 122.0 113.2 147.4
4.5 2.0 65.0 34.3 24.9
8.0 8.0 80.0 57.0 67.2
13.6 17.1 95.0 92.2 115.0
30.0 55.5 130.0 151.6 230.0
55.0 97.1 175.0 224.6 377.1
130.0 364.0 300.0 479.5 1,009.4
6.6 6.3 95.0 30.5 39.4
28.5 26.9 125.0 117.8 157.6
48.0 45.7 135.0 140.3 211.6
55.0 56.6 130.0 147.9 226.3
60.0 51.4 129.0 149.2 214.6
46.0 40.0 111.0 122.6 169.6
35.0 38.5 130.0 131.4 183.9
10.0 7.2 92.0 58.2 56.8
38.2 50.5 122.0 156.9 240.1
6.8 3.9 NA 8.9 13.4
2.0 1.3 49.5 8.2 8.2
7.5 10.6 70.0 62.6 75.1
30.0 53.1 120.0 144.8 215.2
76.5 201.7 200.0 281.8 508.5
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of living at retirement. Median financial holdings actually fall to $51,400
for families with a head between ages 65 and 74, and to just $40,000 for
families headed by someone age 75 or older,evidence that helps to explain
why so many families rely on Social Security benefits for their retirement
years. By contrast, the top decile of wealth holders had a median financial
portfolio worth $707,400—probably enough to purchase a comfortable
annuity. Clearly, outside the top couple of deciles, most Americans do not
have enough financial wealth to see them through much of a retirement.
And note that these wealth figures overstate the financial position of fam-
ilies of modest means, since they include only those families that actually
hold assets (see Note, Table 1).
Therefore,the case for existence of an ownership society rests on home
ownership, since owner-occupied homes represent the only significant
asset held by families across all income and wealth percentiles.Widespread
home ownership is one of the factors that distinguishes American society
from European society, in keeping with the rugged individualism for
which Americans are rightly famous. Furthermore, local community
organizations have long recognized the contribution made by home own-
ership to developing a sense of community pride, which leads to rising
property values and enhanced neighborhood quality of life. Even if one
also notes that promotion of neighborhood “values” can result in racial
and ethnic segregation as well as the exclusivity of gated communities, the
social and individual benefits that accrue to neighborhoods with high 
proportions of owner-occupied housing cannot be discounted. Thus,
home ownership is a critical component of the claim that ours is an own-
ership society, and that broader ownership would further the social good.
In 2001, the primary residence accounted for 47 percent of all nonfi-
nancial assets held by families. Indeed, for the family with a head aged 55
to 64, the median value of the primary residence totaled $130,000—over
71 percent of the aforementioned median net worth of $182,000 for fam-
ilies with a head in this age group. In contrast, median retirement account
holdings for families with a head in this age group amounted to $55,000
(for families that had a retirement account). For home-owning families in
the bottom income decile, the primary residence had a median value of
$65,000,compared with median values of stocks at $7,500 or of retirement
accounts worth just $4,500 (for families holding these assets). Hence, the
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value of the family home accounts for most of the wealth of low-income
families as well as those families with a head close to retirement.Finally,as
the data in Table 1 demonstrate, families that do not own a home have
insignificant amounts of other forms of wealth, with median family net
worth equal to $4,800, median retirement accounts valued at only $6,800,
and financial assets equal to just $3,900.Those who “choose”to rent rather
than own their homes pay a huge penalty because of the close correlation
between home ownership and wealth. Clearly, renters will not participate
in any meaningful way in the ownership society envisioned by the neo-
cons. By contrast, families that own their home have a median value of
asset holdings equal to $240,100—about 18 times greater than the median
holdings of renters who had any assets. Home ownership does seem to
open the path to wealth.
However, there are two reasons that analysts should not get carried
away with counting home values as “wealth” and therefore further proof
we have already become an ownership society,at least for 70 percent of the
population.First,many home “owners”have mortgages against their prop-
erties, and that debt has been rising quickly. In 1984, mortgage debt
equaled 40 percent of personal disposable income,but that increased to 60
percent in 1998 and is 80 percent today (Galbraith 2005).Further,families
have to live somewhere, so liquidating the family home means purchase of
another,or moving into a rental unit that is not usually of comparable qual-
ity,and that commits the family to rents in perpetuity.If demographics and
home-buyer tastes are accommodative,a retiree could conceivably downsize
housing and realize some of the net proceeds, to be used for support pur-
poses in old age or otherwise. Once mortgage debt and housing needs are
satisfied, however, the vast majority of families will not have much left after
liquidating their homes. Homes may be “liquid,” but they do not represent
much “net” available to support other consumption. Indeed, rather than
downsizing, what we have observed in recent years is a tendency to cash out
equity—which has been described as the housing “ATM”phenomenon.This
is a major contributing factor in the rising ratio of mortgage debt to income.
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Debt: The Other Side of the Ownership Coin
And American families have taken on a lot of debt.About 75 percent of all
families have some kind of debt. This varies—mostly inversely—by net
worth, with 69 percent of the poorest quartile having some kind of debt,
and 80 percent of families in the second-lowest quartile having debt. The
percentage then falls to 78 percent for the 50th–74.9th percentiles, to 75
percent for the 75th–89.9th percentiles, and to 70 percent for the top decile.
In 2001, home-secured debt
13 accounted for three-quarters of all family
debt,with 45 percent of all families having this type of debt.Nearly half of
families at the very bottom of the wealth distribution had installment loan
and credit card debt. Interestingly, while over 55 percent of all families in
the top decile of net worth had home-secured debt, only a quarter had
installment loan debt, and only 22 percent had credit card debt. Indeed,
installment loan and credit card debt is rather inversely related to income
and wealth distribution—it is less significant among higher-income and
wealth households than among low-income and wealth families. As Table
2 shows, the median installment loan debt among families with such debt
stood at $8,600 for the lowest wealth quartile in 2001, rose gradually to
$11,100 for families in the 75th–89.9th percentile, and $16,000 for the
wealthiest decile. Credit card balances stood at just about $2,000, regard-
less of the wealth percentile. Hence, installment debt and credit card bal-
ances entail a burden that varies inversely with wealth and income.
Table 2 also shows that debt-service ratios (ratios of debt payment to
family income) were around 17 percent for all but the top income decile—
for which the ratio fell to just 11 percent.Heavy debt burdens likewise vary
inversely with income and wealth: the ratio of debt to family income
exceeded 40 percent for 27 percent of families in the lowest income quin-
tile, for 16 percent of families in the next quintile, for 11.7 percent of fam-
ilies in the middle quintile, for 5.6 percent of families in the fourth
quintile, and for just 2 percent of families in the top decile. Similarly, the
percent of families with a debt payment 60 days or more past due fell
sharply with family income or wealth: nearly 18 percent of families in the
bottom quartile of net worth had such overdue debt, versus only 0.3 per-
cent of families in the top decile.
In sum, the wealthiest decile enjoyed median family net worth that
was 1,184 times greater, financial assets that were 544 times greater, and
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nonfinancial assets worth 166 times more than those held by the lowest
quartile. Further, 95 percent of the wealthiest decile of households owned
a primary residence,and 42 percent also owned other residential property;
only 14 percent of the bottom quartile owned a primary residence—and
forget about a second home for this group. Yet, the poorest households
faced much higher debt burdens,with nearly 14 times more families in the
lowest income quintile carrying debt greater than 40 percent of their mea-
ger incomes, and with 60 times as many low-wealth families with debt in
arrears when compared with the wealthiest families. So, while financial
assets and net worth holdings are heavily skewed toward the richest house-
holds, debts are more “democratically” shared—with the bottom half of
the wealth distribution actually “enjoying” more debt relative to income,
and absolutely higher levels of debt in some cases.
There is a sort of inexorably perverse ownership-society logic in all
this.In recent years,banks have promoted “100 percent”(typically “80/20”)
mortgages in which home buyers borrow a “down payment”(for example,
20 percent of the home value) at a high interest rate. According to one
report, nearly half of new mortgages are no-money-down deals, and 36
percent of homes are bought with adjustable-rate mortgages;further,cash-
out home refinancings are now running at a pace of $400 billion yearly
(Schurr 2005). With little or no equity cushion on many of these new
mortgages, even a slight downturn in real estate prices—or a decline in
household income—could lead to foreclosures. Moreover, the Fed contin-
ues to raise rates; although this has not yet had much impact on household
mortgage rates, it will eventually succeed in raising them, causing variable
rates to spike.
All of this comes at the peak of what appears to be a real estate bub-
ble, with even the Fed mumbling about possible speculative excesses, as
well as a boom in overall household borrowing that makes a housing mar-
ket downturn all the more likely. As Chairman Greenspan recently put it:
“Without calling the overall national issue a bubble,it’s pretty clear that it’s
an unsustainable underlying pattern”(Andrews 2005b). He even invented
a new term for the phenomenon, calling it housing market “froth,” fueled
by speculation that has caused residential real estate prices to climb at 
double-digit rates for the last several years in many cities.One recent study
found that 818,000 of the two million new jobs created since the end of
 Table 2 Family Debt: Distribution by Family Characteristic,Type of Debt,
Debt Ratios,and Debt Past Due,2001
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All families 67.1 9.5 1.9
Percentile of income
Less than 20 27.2 4.4 1.0
20–39.9 40.3 6.7 1.3
40–59.9 47.9 8.7 2.1
60–79.9 70.8 13.0 2.4
80–89.9 87.6 12.5 2.2
90–100 127.4 15.8 3.3
Age of head (yrs.)
less than 35 77.3 9.9 1.6
35–44 76.2 8.3 2.2
45–54 74.0 10.9 2.0
55–64 52.2 9.0 2.2
65–74 28.3 7.0 1.2
75 or more 23.1 9.7 0.8
Race or ethnicity of head
White non-Hispanic 67.5 9.8 2.2 NA NA NA
People of color** 67.5 7.8 1.2 NA NA NA
Housing status
Owner 67.5 10.4 2.2
Renter or other NA 8.3 1.4
Percentile of net worth
Less than 25 61.5 8.6 1.7
25–49.9 60.0 8.5 2.0
50–74.9 64.2 9.7 2.0
75–89.9 76.2 11.1 1.6















*See Note, p. 20 
**This category is called “nonwhite or Hispanic”in the Survey of Consumer Finances.
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2001 can be linked to housing: construction, home-furnishing stores, and
the real estate services sector (Schurr 2005). Greenspan tried to downplay
the risks, arguing,“Even if there are declines in prices, the significant run-
up to date has so increased equity in homes that only those who have pur-
chased very recently, purchased before prices actually, literally go down,
are going to have problems”(Andrews 2005b).However,the repercussions
of a slowdown in real estate markets could be far-reaching,to say the least,
given the level of household debt, given that the family home represents a
huge chunk of typical household wealth, and given how important the
housing bubble has been for job creation.
The timing was thus impeccably inappropriate for bankruptcy
“reform” designed to put pressure on “deadbeat” households—that is, on
those families with little “ownership,” but lots of debt. It is ironic that the
30-year mortgage brought to us by New Deal government guarantees—
making home ownership possible for working Americans for the first
time—has morphed into a speculation-fueling, debt-pushing juggernaut
that is likely to bury homeowners in a mountain of liabilities from which
they will not be able to seek bankruptcy protection. Creditors will emerge
as owners of the foreclosed houses and with claims on debtors,who will be
subject to a form of perpetual debt bondage under Chapter 13 (which,
unlike Chapter 7 bankruptcy, requires a repayment plan).
Widespread home ownership is beneficial,and for at least some of the
reasons enumerated by promoters of the ownership society. However, to
equate holding a mortgaged family home with membership in a class of
“citizen investors”(as Glassman does) borders on delusion, because many
“home owners” merely occupy, manage, and improve homes proximately
owned by banks and mortgage companies that are in turn owned by the
true owner class—those with lots of wealth, particularly financial wealth,
but little debt. Today’s home owner cannot even be equated to the “yeo-
man farmer”of Jefferson’s period,or to the small business owner of today,
much less to the real owner class that begins somewhere north of the 97th
income-and-wealth percentile.
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An Alternative Agenda
Perhaps it is not the goal of the reformers,but it certainly does appear that
their policies will create a sharper division between a relatively small class
of owners and a much larger class of nonowners—including the putative
owners of homes.
If the reformers succeed, one possibility is that government policy
would increasingly be directed by and for the owners, for, as Gouverneur
Morris explained more than two centuries ago, a primary (if not the pri-
mary) purpose of government is to protect the property of the owner class.
If inequality rises,this class will shrink,reducing the moral justification for
protection of property even as the need for protection of property rises.In
truth,the contemplated reforms may not simply turn back the clock to the
good old pre–New Deal days of 1932. It could take us a good part of the
way back to 1776, when citizenship was literally equated by some found-
ing fathers to property ownership by white males—and when the idea that
government ought to intervene to provide safety nets and entitlements to
the nonowning classes was far from public discourse.
In the days leading up to the American Revolution, Morris and other
wealth holders preferred to reconcile with Britain rather than face a
democracy that included “reptiles” (Morris’s term for working people)
forming a “mob” to gain independence (Morris 1774). Ultimately, they
opted for a republican form of government controlled by elites.
Interestingly, suffrage would be expanded to include all landowners on 
the argument that this would help secure “the main object of Society”
while reducing “the danger of an aristocracy installed with the purchased
votes of the propertyless” (Kurland and Lerner 1987). In any case, the
Madison/Morris view did not go unchallenged. While Franklin and
Jefferson also recognized the benefits of ownership, they worried about
equity. Franklin believed that “all property beyond that required for the
‘Conservation of the Individual and the Propagation of the Species’ could
be enjoyed only on terms that the public might set through its laws. . . .
Jefferson,too,maintained that holders of property,who owed all of its safe
enjoyment and much of its title to ‘social law’rather than nature,could not
raise absolute claims that denied society what its welfare required.”
More importantly, Webster argued that, since “property is the basis of
power,”only “a general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property”
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could justify a republican form of government (Kurland and Lerner 1987).
Thus,not only did these founding fathers reject the notion of an inviolable
right to enjoy the fruits of unlimited wealth, but they also recognized that
preferential treatment of property rights by government could only be jus-
tified if property were more or less equally distributed. In the framework
of today’s debate about the ownership society,the justification for many of
the “reforms” advanced by advocates falls flat in the face of the evidence
that wealth is highly unequally distributed—unless a very strong case can
be made that these policy changes would quickly lead to a significant
improvement of that distribution.
Whether by design or by accident, the ownership-society reforms
would be likely to do the opposite,increasing inequality and concentrating
wealth among the owner classes. For example, shifting taxes to consump-
tion would give a tremendous advantage to those whose incomes are
already so high that consumption is a small fraction of saving or wealth
accumulation, and would make it nearly impossible for lower-income
households to save, by reducing their already meager after-consumption
income. As many analysts have demonstrated, the mostly small private
accounts that are meant to replace Social Security will incur high manage-
ment fees, so that retirement annuities will be insufficient to support low-
wealth households.With high consumption taxes and the deterioration of
private pensions, not to mention rising health care premiums and what-
ever “reforms” that might be made to Medicaid and Medicare, many aged
persons will face an uncertain retirement. Shifting the burden of health
care, education, retirement, taxes, unemployment, and losses due to med-
ical malpractice and faulty products to working people might help to pro-
tect the property and interests of the owning class, but it will increase the
barriers to entry into privilege. As many of today’s millionaires can attest
(and folk wisdom holds that it is actually the vast majority of them), mul-
tiple chances afforded by bankruptcy protection are almost a prerequisite
to the accumulation of significant wealth. Limiting access to court protec-
tion, whether in the case of bankruptcy or in the case of injuries due to
malpractice, will preserve the wealth of owners while concentrating the
costs of misfortune in the nonownership class.
The “reformers”have yet to present argument or evidence in support of
the belief that removing safety nets will achieve a more equal distribution of
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wealth while promoting “efficient” decisions. Indeed, a reasonable argu-
ment could be made that people are “freer”to take a long-run view—with
possible short-run costs but eventual high payoffs—in the presence of
safety nets. The “gestation period” of a worker is 16 years in the case of a
high school dropout and perhaps as long as 30 years (or more) in the case
of a college graduate with an advanced degree.Surely the existence of both
household and public-sector safety nets is helpful in tipping the bias
toward the longer end of that spectrum. The already-wealthy have a pri-
vate safety net (their wealth). In the presence of a publicly-provided safety
net,the not-yet-wealthy are freer to pursue their dreams,because bad luck
won’t lead to severe deprivation.
Further, as Krugman has argued, public safety nets have become even
more important as globalization has eroded the ability or willingness of
U.S. firms to pay decent wages with benefits (Krugman 2005c). As low-
wage competition from abroad has increased, more workers have had to
rely on Medicaid for health care and food stamps for food. Krugman
reports that the average GM worker in 1968 received $29,000 a year in
wages (measured in today’s dollars), plus generous health and retirement
benefits; a Wal-Mart worker today earns roughly $17,000, and only half of
the company’s workers are covered by a health care plan. Increasing
reliance on “market discipline” in health care has priced this out of reach
for many families. Hence, erosion of public safety nets would make mat-
ters even worse for workers trying to make do with lower wages and fewer
employer-provided benefits. This is intuitively recognized by workers;
according to a recent poll,67 percent of Americans want guaranteed health
care for all citizens—an expanded health care safety net,not more individ-
ual responsibility for health care expenses.
Cheap and easy access to higher education is also important, as is the
availability of reasonably priced real estate and home mortgages. Since the
New Deal, the federal government has played a major role in both of these
areas. And, as James K. Galbraith has argued, the two are inextricably
linked:the wider access to a college education makes American households
better credit risks in the eyes of mortgage lenders. Unfortunately, the fed-
eral government has recently, and substantially, reduced its role in these
areas: student loans and mortgage loans have been “freed” to face greater
market discipline, even as the burden of higher education has increased,
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with tuition rising much faster than wages and the general price level.
Government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
also been under attack,both for possible management malfeasance and for
their “unfair” competition with private lenders (even as they have been
given freer reign to behave like profit-maximizing financial behemoths).It
is far too early to know how this will play out,but it is at least possible that
the federal government’s role in ensuring wide and easy access to low-cost,
fixed-rate mortgage loans is in jeopardy.
The Bush administration’s refusal to raise minimum wages and to
extend unemployment benefits increases hardship; its plan to favor “per-
sonal reemployment accounts” will almost certainly replace already lim-
ited “entitlements”with greater individual responsibility for retraining,job
search, and childcare. Income, health care, and Social Security safety nets
not only reduce out-of-pocket expenses for families, but, to repeat, also
provide the security that allows families to take longer-run decisions such
as higher education for the children or retirement accounts for the parents.
By chopping off the public legs of the retirement,education,employment,
and health care stools, the neocon reformers will force families to take the
short-run views that make them more dependent on good fortune,and on
charity when that fails.(As readers of Charles Dickens know,we have been
there before.)
If the goal is to create an ownership society that is something more
than an ideological slogan, then policy should follow an alternative path,
because most of the proposed “reforms” are likely to worsen distribution
and restrict access to ownership.In any case,for the reasons advanced ear-
lier, the neocon reforms should not be undertaken until a vastly more
equal distribution of income and wealth is achieved. A real alternative to
the “ownership society” agenda would strengthen safety nets, increase
income and wealth at the bottom of the distribution, guarantee universal
access to higher education, and provide the guarantee of a job at a living
wage. Such policy changes would increase the probability that more
Americans could join the “ownership”class, and would provide more jus-
tification for government policies that favor ownership. At best, the pro-
ponents of the ownership society have put the cart before the horse,
believing that a lack of individual responsibility is the cause of income and
wealth disparities. But offering de jure “choice”and removing social safety
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nets when households do not have adequate means are likely to simply
worsen inequality without improving real choices for most Americans.
Interestingly, none other than Newt Gingrich has recognized that
redistribution is necessary before the goal of spreading benefits of the new
ownership society can be achieved.When asked whether the Bush admin-
istration’s agenda amounted to anything more than a charade, Gingrich
responded,“No.It means the next stage is to see whether or not he has the
nerve to propose real redistribution.”
15 That is the $64,000 question.
Notes
1. The author thanks Yan Liang for substantial research assistance.
2. As Boaz argues,“There is a good deal of historical evidence . . . as well
as abundant contemporary evidence,that ownership tends to encour-
age self-esteem and healthy habits of behaviour, such as acting more
for the long term, or taking education more seriously”(Boaz 2005).
3. “Today’s Entitlement Age, based on New Deal assumptions that dis-
courage economic independence and often place government in a role
antagonistic to the private sector, will fade.And there will rise instead
an ownership society, based on the assumption that when families
share in the growth of businesses and the economy,everyone benefits.
. . . The ownership society is the biggest political idea since the New
Deal. No wonder it threatens the party that dominated government
for the half-century after Franklin Roosevelt’s election as President”
(Glassman 2005).
4. James Madison in “Federalist No. 10,” quoted in McCann 1991, pp.
53–57.
5. McCann 1991,p.53.McCann goes on to quote Nedelsky that Madison’s
vision was one where the “people as a whole would be relegated to the
margins of politics, but guaranteed the freedom and security to pur-
sue their private interests—which was the real purpose of govern-
ment.” This, according to Nedelsky, explains Madison’s opposition to
redistributive policies, including debt relief.
6. Gouverneur Morris explains: “This Conclusion results that the State
of Society is perfected in Proportion as the Rights of Property are
secured.” The Founders’ Constitution (Kurland and Lerner 1987,
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p. 578) sums up the views of many of the founders:“Proprietorship is
a condition for entry and full participation in political life, a prereq-
uisite for the necessary independence that would guard the citizenry
from becoming the mere instruments of the powerful and ambitious,
a token of the seriousness of one’s commitment to stability and order,
and a claim to a full voice in the disposition of the community’s
affairs, especially as those bear on the enjoyment of one’s own.”
7. The poll found that 56 percent of respondents opposed the president’s
plan to phase out wage indexing as income rises above $20,000 (Lester
2005). The survey also shows that while 70 percent of those polled
have become convinced that Social Security faces financing problems,
60 percent do not like the way the president is handling the issue, and
48 percent said they trust Democrats more on this issue, with only 36
percent trusting Republicans more.
8. It should be noted that some on the far right oppose the “No Child
Left Behind” legislation, apparently not understanding that it can be
used to push children into private schools as “failing” public schools
lose funding.
9. “[A] key element of the ownership society is that to take full advan-
tage of it, you must put up a great deal more of your own money—
pay to play, if you will. And that principle of pay to play applies in
fields ranging from retirement to education to health care. Private
employers, long the source of a truly secure retirement for so many,
have already begun their retreat from the social safety net and
embraced the ownership philosophy”(Crenshaw 2005).
10. “Other reforms that could enhance the ownership society include . . .
wider use of Health Savings Accounts, which transfer control over
health care decisions from employers, insurance companies and
HMO gatekeepers to individual patients”(Boaz 2005).
11. It is notable Alan Greenspan headed the commission that recommended
the 1983 payroll tax hike; symmetrically, he also gave President Bush’s
recent tax cuts for the rich the “Maestro” seal of approval. He then
completed the trifecta by using the budget deficit as an argument for
revising policy to raise saving rates,including a shift to a consumption
tax, even as he endorsed Social Security benefit cuts (Andrews 2005a;
Greenspan 2005).
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12. These data are for those households that held any financial assets,
including bonds,stocks,mutual funds,retirement accounts,and other
financial assets.
13. This includes first and second mortgages, home equity loans, and
lines of credit secured by the primary residence.
14. In this paper, I have focused on data for the top income and wealth
percentile, but it is well established that there is a “kink” at about the
97th percentile, with a very high concentration of wealth in the top 
3 percent. See Peterson 1994.
15. Quoted in Miller 2004.
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